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Abstract 
This paper examines the licensing of an innovation—by a patent holder to one or more users—when 
the innovation’s value (high or low) is known, after the contract is signed, by each user. In this setup, 
we analyze the patent holder’s joint decision concerning the number of licenses and the type of 
contracts. Our first main finding is that, depending on how uncertain is the efficiency of users 
exploiting the innovation, both shut-down contracts and screening contracts can emerge in 
equilibrium. Second, shut-down contracts amount to fixed fees under exclusive licensing but are two-
part contracts under non-exclusive licensing. Third, there is distorted production at the bottom of the 
innovation value’s distribution under exclusive licensing as well as distortion at both the bottom and 
the top of that distribution under non-exclusive licensing. Fourth, asymmetric information favors the 
latter (i.e., issuing multiple licenses) except when the patent holder uses a screening contract, since 
then the need to distort production at both the bottom and the top renders non-exclusive licensing less 
profitable. Our final result is that the number of licenses issued by the patent holder is more likely to 
maximize aggregate surplus under asymmetric information than under symmetric information. 
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1. Introduction 
The term licensing refers to transferring, in exchange for monetary compensation, the rights to 
commercialize a patent holder’s technology. The possibility of technology transfer increases the 
incentives of inventors, and it enables innovations to be transformed into a new process or new 
product. Licensing has become more pronounced during the last few decades, as most firms in all 
sectors report the number of their licensing deals (as well as their licensing revenues) have increased 
over time. Cohen et al. (2000) reference the Carnegie Mellon Survey on Industrial R&D and report 
that, between 1983 and 1995, US patent awards grew by 78%; they also find that, in ten different 
industries, at least 40% of survey respondents specifically identify licensing revenues as a motive for 
patenting. Similarly, Gallardo et al. (2016) document a sharp increase in the number of patented fruit 
varieties developed by breeding programs at public universities in the United States. Finally, studies 
funded by the OECD (OECD, 2009) have gathered evidence confirming the greater volume and value 
of patent licensing in recent years—a phenomenon that the OECD finds is related to broad changes in 
globalization, strengthened market competition, and modes of innovation. 
A central aim of the licensing literature is to identify contracts that are optimal from the patent 
owner’s perspective. Factors that influence contract terms include whether the licensor is an outsider 
or instead a competitor (in the same product market) of the licensee, whether imitation is easy or 
difficult, whether patent protection is enforceable or imperfect, whether the innovation is drastic or 
merely incremental, and whether or not information asymmetries exist with regard to the patent’s 
innovation value. 
In its study of asymmetric information, the extant licensing literature focuses mainly on examining—
conditional on only a single license being granted—the fixed fees and royalties that a patent holder 
can use as signaling or screening devices (Beggs, 1992; Macho-Stadler et al., 1996; Poddar and Sinha, 
2002; Sen, 2005). Yet it is crucial to explore the outcomes resulting from multiple downstream 
licensees, because in that case the patent holder gains an additional signaling/screening tool: the 
number of licenses granted (Wu and Peng, 2015). And because the number of licenses sold is 
endogenously determined in an optimal licensing scheme, it follows that this instrument could affect 
the use of royalties and fixed fees (i.e., as a signaling or screening device). This topic is necessarily 
overlooked by research that fails to incorporate the patent holder’s choice of how many licenses to 
grant. We remark that the possibility of granting several licenses is a real-world phenomenon; a patent 
holder must not only determine the licensing contract terms but also identify the buyers to whom 
licenses are sold. Li and Wang (2010) document several cases that illustrate the convention of using 
both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts, and a 2001 survey by the Association of University 
Technology Managers found a nearly even split between the number of exclusive versus non-
exclusive licenses (Caballero-Sanz et al., 2005). 
3 
This paper jointly examines optimal contract design and the optimal number of licenses to grant, 
where in both cases “optimal” is defined from the patent owner’s perspective. Thus we consider an 
inventor that owns an innovation whose cost of development is sunk. The inventor has obtained a 
patent, so the innovative technology cannot be legally replicated. The technology can be employed as 
an input to produce a homogeneous final good, but the patent owner has no production capacity and is 
therefore obliged to license the patent in exchange for monetary compensation. We assume that many 
firms—if given access to the technology—do have the needed production capacity. In what follows, 
patent holder refers to the inventor and users are the firms seeking the right to utilize its patent. In our 
setup, there can be either one user (in which case a monopoly market arises) or two users (in which 
case those users compete against each other as Cournot players). 
Each user can be either efficient or inefficient at exploiting the innovation. An efficient or “good” user 
is one that has zero marginal cost when transforming the innovation into the final good; an inefficient 
or “bad” user is one that does incur a positive marginal cost. Since only the users—and not the patent 
holder—know their respective marginal costs, it follows that both the number of licenses and the form 
of licensing contracts are decided by assessing the likelihood of the innovation being exploited by an 
inefficient user. 
The research reported here yielded three main findings. First, when there is non-exclusive licensing 
through separating menus of screening contracts, those contracts incorporate royalties irrespective of 
the user’s efficiency; in this case, the contracts of both user types are  distorted. This dynamic is in 
sharp contrast with the case of exclusive licensing, under which only the contract designed for an 
inefficient user is distorted. The reason is that, if the patent holder will grant only an exclusive license 
and is worried about screening, then the contract intended for the inefficient type is designed so as to 
be unattractive to the efficient type (because that minimizes the informational rents paid to the latter). 
Hence the patent holder distorts the contract intended for an inefficient type. Under non-exclusive 
licensing, however, a patent holder looking to induce self-selection can offer a menu of user-specific 
contracts—a procedure that can be viewed as a two-stage decision. In the first stage, the patent holder 
looks for the equivalent of a monopoly outcome (collusion effect), which requires that royalties be 
charged to both efficient and inefficient users. In the second stage, the situation resembles the 
exclusive licensing context; hence the menu of contracts that the patent holder offers to each user is 
such that the contract intended for the efficient type does not distort that user’s production. At the 
same time, though, the contract intended for inefficient users allows for additional distortion so that it 
will be less attractive to efficient users. In sum, the presence of royalties in contracts intended for 
efficient types can be explained by the patent holder’s incentives to replicate the monopoly outcome 
(collusion effect). The royalties present in contracts intended for inefficient types reflect two 
motivations: the patent holder’s abiding incentive to replicate the monopoly outcome and its incentive 
to make the contract less appealing to efficient users. 
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The second finding concerns the impact of adverse selection as compared to symmetric information 
on the number of licenses granted. Non-exclusive licensing is more likely to be employed under 
adverse selection than under symmetric information. With regard to the former, we must distinguish 
screening from restricting licenses to only efficient users. If the patent holder chooses a contract that 
allows for screening the users, then it is better-off granting only one license. Yet if symmetric 
information prevails, then non-exclusive licensing would benefit the patent holder more because 
competition’s negative effect on its profits can be offset by royalties (Antelo and Sampayo, 2016). 
However, when adverse selection is combined with competition, the patent holder must use royalties 
in order to induce screening. The use of royalties for screening is so detrimental to patent holder 
profits that exclusive licensing is preferred—even though it entails giving up the advantages of 
sampling. 
The third main finding concerns how the number of licenses granted affects welfare (taking 
subsequent contracts and producer behavior as given). Namely: for a cost—of transferring the 
innovation to each user—at which aggregate welfare under exclusive licensing increases with 
information symmetry, non-exclusive licensing yields greater welfare under asymmetric information 
unless the patent holder uses a screening contract. With screening, welfare under exclusive licensing 
is greater even though consumer surplus is higher with non-exclusive licensing. The implication is 
that, under screening, the loss in consumer surplus that results from a switch to exclusive licensing is 
more than offset by the increased patent holder profits. This result emphasizes our second finding by 
showing how strong is a screening contract’s negative effect—when combined with Cournot 
competition—on patent holder profits. 
Both the form of licensing contracts and the number of licenses granted are examined in Li and Wang 
(2010), Doganoglu and Inceoglu (2014), and Wu and Peng (2015). Li and Wang (2010) show that the 
patent holder’s preference (or not) for granting an exclusive license depends on both the licensing 
contract and the innovation’s degree of novelty; they also establish that non-exclusive licensing may 
be welfare reducing. Doganoglu and Inceoglu (2014) study the case of a monopolist who owns a 
drastic innovation that enables the creation of differentiated products. They find that a monopolist 
remaining outside the industry can replicate multiproduct monopoly profits by way of two-part 
licensing contracts. Finally, Wu and Peng (2015) show that an innovator with privileged information 
about its technology uses a higher but still suboptimal royalty as a signal of “type” when it must 
license to all downstream firms in an oligopolistic industry. These authors also demonstrate that, if the 
number of licenses sold is determined endogenously, then the innovator should use the number of 
licenses sold—rather than a higher royalty—to signal its type. So, in the separating equilibrium that 
maximizes the innovator’s payoff, the efficient innovator grants fewer licenses than does the 
inefficient one. 
5 
Our setting is characterized by asymmetric information, unlike the perfect information setting of Li 
and Wang (2010) and Doganoglu and Inceoglu (2014). Our paper differs also from Wu and Peng 
(2015) in that they consider a signaling game in which (i) the innovator is better informed than the 
users about the innovation’s value and (ii) these users are equally efficient at exploiting the 
innovation. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic framework for 
developing our analysis, and Section 3 addresses the model’s equilibrium under symmetric 
information. In Section 4 we introduce asymmetric information—and allow for screening—toward 
the end of identifying the equilibrium number and form of licensing contracts. Section 5 focuses on 
deriving the total surplus that results from granting one versus two licenses (while assuming that all 
other aspects of Section 4’s equilibrium solution remain unchanged). We conclude in Section 6 with 
summary remarks and a proposed extension. 
 
2. The model 
An inventor owns an innovation with sunk development costs. Because this inventor has secured a 
patent, competitors cannot (legally) replicate the innovation. Although the innovation can be used to 
produce a homogeneous final good, the patent holder is not capable of production for market. Hence 
the inventor licenses the innovation in exchange for monetary compensation. It is typical of real-life 
scenarios that the patent holder can choose from among many suitors seeking access to the 
innovation. However, we ensure computational feasibility—and highlight the mechanisms at play—
by restricting our attention to just two cases: when the patent holder contracts with one user (exclusive 
licensing) or with two users (non-exclusive licensing). 
When licensing the innovation, the patent holder acts as a Stackelberg leader facing users. Note that 
any user accepting the patent holder’s licensing contract will discover its own profitability from 
putting the innovation into practice. In contrast, third parties—that is, the patent holder (under 
exclusive licensing) or the patent holder and the potential rival user (under non-exclusive licensing)—
have only a prior probability about others’ profits. 
Each user can be efficient or inefficient when exploiting the innovation. Whereas an efficient (good) 
user does not incur a marginal cost, 𝑐𝑐 = 0, when transforming the innovation into the final good an 
inefficient (bad) user does incur a positive marginal cost, 𝑐𝑐 > 0. The random variable ?̃?𝑐 representing 
marginal cost is distributed as follows: 
 ?̃?𝑐 = � 0  with Prob 𝜇𝜇        𝑐𝑐  with Prob 1 − 𝜇𝜇 (1) 
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here 0 < 𝜇𝜇 < 1 . There is a cost 𝑆𝑆 > 0 , which is borne by the patent holder, of transferring the 
innovation to each user.1 All players in this licensing game are risk neutral, and no player discounts 
the future. 
As regards the market for any innovation-based product, there is a unit-sized continuum of symmetric 
and homogeneous consumers. Each consumer has preferences given by the quasi-linear utility 
function 𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞,𝑚𝑚) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) + 𝑚𝑚, where 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) is the utility derived from consuming the product and 𝑚𝑚 
is the numéraire. We shall consider the quadratic utility function 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑞𝑞 − 1
2
𝑞𝑞2 , under which 
market demand may be written as 
 𝑝𝑝(𝑞𝑞) = � 1 − 𝑞𝑞   if  𝑞𝑞 < 1 0           if  𝑞𝑞 ≥ 1 (2) 
where 𝑞𝑞 measures the quantity produced by either one or two users; when there are two users, they are 
assumed to produce an identical good. 
Finally, to ensure regularity we set the following upper bound on the inefficient user’s marginal cost 𝑐𝑐 
when transforming the innovation into the final product. 
Assumption 1. 0 < 𝑐𝑐 < 1
2
 
Under this assumption, if licensing is non-exclusive and if information is symmetric then both users 
will generate positive output—that is, regardless of the differences (if any) in their respective levels of 
transformation efficiency. 
 
3. Symmetric information 
As a benchmark for comparison, we start by assuming that all players in the licensing game share the 
same information about the patented innovation’s value. Thus the timing is as follows. The patent 
holder, who does not know for certain the innovation’s true value, offers a license to one or two users 
in a take-it-or-leave manner. For any commonly held belief about uncertainty, users accept or reject 
the offer. Once a contract is accepted, the user’s type (or the users’ types when there are two users) 
becomes common knowledge. Finally, users produce the final good as a monopoly or Cournot 
duopoly according as whether one or two licenses were granted. In this context, a patent holder’s 
optimal behavior is formalized by the following proposition. 
                                                          
1 This may be understood as the cost of producing an input that is used by licensees. 
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Proposition 1 (Antelo and Sampayo, 2016). If information about the innovation’s value is uncertain 
but symmetric, then there is a threshold 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ≡ 1
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[𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)(2 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐] of the per-license issuing 
cost such that the following statements hold. 
(i) If 𝑆𝑆 < 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), then the patent holder prefers non-exclusive licensing and sells each license 
via either a two-part contract (when the users have the same type) or a fixed-fee contract 
(when they have different types). 
(ii) If 𝑆𝑆 > 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), then the patent holder prefers exclusive licensing through a fixed-fee contract. 
(iii) If 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), then the patent holder is indifferent between (i) and (ii). 
Under exclusive licensing, the revenue from licensing is maximized when the user’s market behavior 
is not distorted. In this case, the patent holder offers a fixed-fee contract that extracts all of the user’s 
expected profit. The same thing happens under non-exclusive licensing, provided that the two users 
have different types. In this latter case, the per-unit royalty charged to the inefficient user is so high 
that it is better-off rejecting the contract; the efficient user is then left as the market’s unique 
producer—a monopolist. However, if licensing is non-exclusive and users are identical, then the 
patent holder benefits from contracts that include royalties; in this way, the innovator can soften the 
competition between potential users to such an extent that the monopoly outcome can be achieved. 
The threshold per-license issuing cost at which the patent holder is indifferent between exclusive 
versus non-exclusive licensing increases with 𝑐𝑐 and is concave in 𝜇𝜇. Granting two licenses is more 
likely as 𝑐𝑐  increases because competition then becomes less intense. Likewise, if there is no 
uncertainty (i.e., if 𝜇𝜇 = 0  or 𝜇𝜇 = 1) then the patent holder will license a single user to put the 
innovation into practice (i.e., no matter the value of S). Yet under maximal uncertainty (𝜇𝜇 = 1 2⁄ ), the 
innovation is most likely licensed to two users—especially when c is high. 
 
4. Asymmetric information 
We now examine two topics in the context of adverse selection: the patent holder’s optimal number of 
licenses to grant and the optimal contract for it to offer in the two licensing cases considered. 
4.1. Exclusive licensing 
Exclusive licensing under asymmetric information leads to a licensing-screening game whose timing 
is as follows. The patent holder, before knowing the innovation’s value, offers one license to the user 
in exchange for a fixed fee plus contracted royalty payments. The user, which already knows the 
value it can obtain from transforming the innovation into a final good (this value determines the user’s 
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“type”), either accepts or rejects the offered contract. If the contract is accepted, then the accepting 
user’s type becomes publicly known. Finally, the user produces and markets the final good. 
With exclusive licensing, the patent holder has three options. First, it can offer a non-screening 
contract under which both user types (efficient and inefficient) can produce; in this case, revised 
beliefs concerning the innovation value are equivalent to priors. Second, the patent holder can offer 
what is known as a shut-down contract: a contract whose fixed fee is so high that production will 
occur only if the user is efficient at transforming the innovation—in which case the innovation might 
never be embedded in a final good. Third, a patent holder can devise two contracts—one geared to 
efficient users and the other to inefficient users—and thereby allow the innovation to become 
manifest and marketed regardless of users’ respective abilities. 
Our next proposition addresses the screening of innovation value. Recall that, for efficient (resp. 
inefficient) users, the marginal cost 𝑐𝑐 is zero (resp. positive); hence we use subscript 0 or 𝑐𝑐 to index 
users who transform the innovation in, respectively, an efficient or inefficient manner. All proofs are 
given in the Appendix. 
Proposition 2. Let 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) = 11+𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 − 𝜇𝜇2)� be a given efficiency level of a bad user. 
Then, under exclusive licensing and asymmetric information, we have the following possibilities. 
(i) (Separating licensing) If the menu of contracts {(𝐹𝐹0, 𝑟𝑟0), (𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 , 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)} = ��14 − �12 −(1+𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐
4(1−𝜇𝜇)� 𝑐𝑐, 0� , ��1−𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐2(1−𝜇𝜇)�2 , 𝜇𝜇1−𝜇𝜇 𝑐𝑐�� is offered to a bad user of efficiency less than 1 − 𝜇𝜇, then 
the innovation is always transformed and marketed no matter how inefficient the user is. 
(ii) (Shut-down licensing) If the menu of contracts 
(𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧�
(1 − (1 + 𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐)24 , 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐� if 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇)
�
14 , 0� if 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) 
is offered to a bad user of efficiency greater than 1 − 𝜇𝜇, then the innovation will not be 
transformed and marketed unless it is of high value. 
According to part (i), an innovation’s true value can be inferred from a revealing or “separating” 
contract offer. In particular, the contract that identifies a high-value innovation is a fixed-fee contract 
(“no distortion at the top”) whereas the contract that identifies a low-value innovation is a two-part 
contract with a fixed fee and a per-unit royalty. The royalty, whose amount depends on the proportion 
of efficient users, is intended to distort the bad user’s production decision (“distortion at the bottom”) 
and thereby make this contract unappealing to the good user, thus minimizing the latter’s 
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informational rents. This finding parallels results obtained in the literature on screening licenses 
(Macho-Stadler et al., 1996; Poddar and Sinha, 2002). 
Part (ii) of the proposition describes the problem of a patent holder that will license only to an 
efficient user, in which case information asymmetry has no part to play. The prescribed shut-down 
contract is simply a fixed-fee payment that the inefficient user rejects; hence the innovation becomes 
manifest only if licensed to an efficient user, which occurs with probability 𝜇𝜇. In a separating contract, 
the distortion at the bottom would be so great (provided 𝜇𝜇 and 𝑐𝑐 satisfy 𝑐𝑐 > 1 − 𝜇𝜇) that the inefficient 
user has no incentive to produce. In this event, the patent holder will switch from a screening contract 
to a shut-down contract under which only efficient production is allowed and there are no 
informational rents to be paid. 
Having examined how the patent holder can screen innovation value, we are now in a position to 
formalize the patent holder’s optimal licensing scheme as follows. 
Proposition 3. Let 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 1−𝜇𝜇1−𝜇𝜇+𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)�� be a given efficiency level of a bad 
user, where 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) ∈ �0, 12�  for all 𝜇𝜇 ∈ (0,1) . In this case, if information is asymmetric then the 
following statements hold. 
(i) If  𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇), exclusive licensing is chosen via a revealing contract and the innovation is 
always put into practice. 
(ii) For 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇), exclusive licensing is chosen via a shut-down contract and the innovation is 
put into practice only by an efficient user. 
Provided the probability 𝜇𝜇 of licensing to a good user remains below 0.28—which is the value that 
solves 1
2
= 1−𝜇𝜇
1−𝜇𝜇+𝜇𝜇2
�1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)�—a patent holder wants the innovation to be transformed and 
marketed irrespective of the user’s (in)efficiency. A patent holder in these circumstances prefers not 
to offer a shut-down fixed-fee contract that a bad user would reject; the reason is that finding a good 
user to accept such a contract is most unlikely. If 𝜇𝜇 ≥ 0.28 then the patent holder offers a separating  
contract when the efficiency of bad users is less than 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇). 
In contrast, if users can be so inefficient that they exceed the threshold determined by 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) then two 
situations must be considered. First, if 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 1 − 𝜇𝜇 then the patent holder could still implement 
a separating contract. Yet the required distortion at the bottom would then diminish the patent 
holder’s benefits due to the inefficient user, in which case those benefits no longer compensate for the 
patent holder’s reduced benefits due to the efficient user. The second possibility is that 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 1 − 𝜇𝜇; 
here the patent holder cannot implement a separating contract. 
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Proposition 3’s results are plotted in Figure 1. In the green area the patent holder offers a 
screening/separating contract and both user types manifest the innovation in a product. In the red area, 
information asymmetry is of no consequence because the patent holder offers a shut-down contract 
and so its innovation will be marketed only with probability 𝜇𝜇. Beneath (resp., above) the red-dashed 
locus, the separating contract as compared with a shut-down contract where both user types (resp., 
only efficient users) produce. 
 
Figure 1. Contracts that are optimal for the patent holder under exclusive licensing. 
 
4.2. Non-exclusive licensing 
Now we consider the case in which the patent holder employs non-exclusive licensing. The licensing 
game proceeds much as in the single-user case. The patent holder offers to each user either a 
screening pair of contracts—of which one is expected to attract the efficient user and the other to 
attract the inefficient firmor a single contract. In the latter case, the patent holder can offer a 
contract that allows both user types to produce or a (shut-down) contract that allows only efficient 
users to produce. Contracts are simultaneously offered to each user before their respective types (good 
or bad) are publicly known. Next, each user either accepts or rejects the offered contract. The user’s 
type is revealed by acceptance provided that different user types prefer different types of contracts. 
Finally, users produce a homogeneous good and compete as Cournot players. 
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Our next proposition characterizes the optimal contract—from the patent holder’s perspective—when 
licensing is non-exclusive. As before, subscripts 0 and c signify an efficient and an inefficient user 
(respectively). 
Proposition 4. Under non-exclusive licensing and asymmetric information, the following statements 
hold. 
(i) (Separating licensing) Let 𝑐𝑐3(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 1−𝜇𝜇1+𝜇𝜇� be a level of efficiency in exploiting the 
innovation, for all 𝜇𝜇 ∈ (0,1). If the menu of contracts {(𝐹𝐹0, 𝑟𝑟0), (𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 , 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)} =
��
1−𝜇𝜇−(2−2𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐−7𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐
16(1−𝜇𝜇) , 1−𝑐𝑐4 � , ��1−𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐4(1−𝜇𝜇) �2 , 1−𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐+5𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐4(1−𝜇𝜇) �� is offered to each user and if the bad 
user’s efficiency is less than 𝑐𝑐3(𝜇𝜇), then the innovation will always be put into practice. 
(ii) (Shut-down licensing) Let 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 11+2𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�2𝜇𝜇(1−𝜇𝜇+𝜇𝜇2)1+𝜇𝜇 �� be a level of 
efficiency in exploiting the innovation, for all 𝜇𝜇 ∈ (0,1). If the unique contract 
(𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧��
1 − 𝑟𝑟2 + 𝜇𝜇�2 , 𝜇𝜇2 + 2𝜇𝜇� if 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇)
��
2 − 2𝑐𝑐 − 2𝑟𝑟 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐6 �2 , 14 + �𝜇𝜇 − 14� 𝑐𝑐� if 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇) 
is offered to each user and if a bad user’s efficiency is less than 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇), then the innovation is 
always produced no matter how inefficient the users are. Otherwise, the innovation will be 
produced only by efficient users. 
Thus the optimal form of non-exclusive licensing contracts differs from that of exclusive licensing 
contracts. First, per part (i), a royalty is part of the contract regardless of whether it is intended to 
attract users that are efficient or inefficient at transforming the innovation into a final good. Hence we 
observe distortion at the bottom and also at the top. The reason is that—in contrast to exclusive 
licensing, under which contracts are designed to elicit revelation—under non-exclusive licensing the 
patent holder retains that goal yet seeks also to replicate the monopoly outcome in the market for the 
final good. So when designing the menu of contracts for each user, the patent holder tries to replicate 
the monopoly outcome and therefore includes a royalty rate both for efficient and for inefficient users. 
Then, once royalties are set such that users behave as a monopoly, the patent holder faces a situation 
that resembles exclusive licensing. Its response is to offer a menu of contracts to each user, where 
contracts intended for efficient users are not distorted beyond the “optimal” level previously charged 
whereas contracts intended for inefficient users are more distorted than the “optimal” level previously 
charged. That extra distortion is meant to reduce this contract’s attractiveness to efficient users. 
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According to part (ii) of Proposition 4, shut-down contracts under non-exclusive licensing are no 
longer (i.e., as under exclusive licensing) pure fixed-fee contracts. Instead, shut-down contracts are 
two-part contracts even when only the efficient types produce—which is the relevant case in 
equilibrium, as Proposition 5 will show. When the patent holder allows only efficient users to 
produce, asymmetric information is irrelevant and so the patent holder’s sole aim is to reproduce, via 
royalties, the monopoly outcome. 
Proposition 5. Let 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) = min�12 , 1−𝜇𝜇1−𝜇𝜇+2𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�2𝜇𝜇(1−𝜇𝜇)1+𝜇𝜇 ��  be a level of inefficiency in 
exploiting the innovation, where 0 < 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇) < 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) ≤ 12   for all 𝜇𝜇 ∈ (0,1) . Under asymmetric 
information, non-exclusive licensing is implemented as follows: 
(i) through a separating menu of contracts if the efficiency of bad users is no bigger than 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇); 
or 
(ii) through a two-part shut-down contract, given by (𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) =  ��2−2𝑐𝑐−2𝑟𝑟−𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇
6
�
2 , 1
4
+ �𝜇𝜇 − 1
4
� 𝑐𝑐�, if 
the efficiency of bad users is no lower than 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇). 
In Figure 2 we plot the different regions of the (𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐)-space where the various licensing contracts are 
optimal for the patent holder. The farther below the 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) locus, the better is a separating contract for 
the patent holder (below the 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇) locus, as compared with a single contract under which all users 
produce; above that locus, as compared with a single contract under which only efficient users 
produce). In the red area, the patent holder benefits more from offering a single contract under which 
only efficient users produce. Observe that, above the 𝑐𝑐3(𝜇𝜇) locus, no comparison is needed because 
the separating contract is not profitable there. 
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Figure 2. Contracts optimal for the patent holder under non-exclusive licensing. 
 
Propositions 1, 3, and 5 allow us to compare the number of licenses that the patent holder grants under 
symmetric information and under screening. We can then identify the scenarios in which each license 
is more likely to be used. 
Proposition 6. Let 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) be the per-license issuing cost at which the patent holder is indifferent 
between exclusive or non-exclusive licensing under symmetric information (as defined in Proposition 
1). In a screening context, at this cost the patent holder prefers non-exclusive licensing in the region 
of parameters Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3 for 
 𝛤𝛤1 = �(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ∈ (0,1) × �0, 12� � 𝑐𝑐6(𝜇𝜇) ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)�, 
  𝛤𝛤2 = �(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ∈ (0,1) × �0, 12� �max{𝑐𝑐7(𝜇𝜇), 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)} ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)�, 
 𝛤𝛤3 = �(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ∈ (0,1) × �0, 12� � 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐8(𝜇𝜇)�, 
 where 𝑐𝑐6(𝜇𝜇) = 2−4𝜇𝜇+2𝜇𝜇21−𝜇𝜇+𝜇𝜇2 , 𝑐𝑐7(𝜇𝜇) = min�12 , 1−2𝜇𝜇+2𝜇𝜇2−𝜇𝜇31−2𝜇𝜇+3𝜇𝜇2−𝜇𝜇3 − (1 − 𝜇𝜇)� 𝜇𝜇[1−𝜇𝜇(1−𝜇𝜇)(2+𝜇𝜇2)](1+𝜇𝜇)(1−2𝜇𝜇+3𝜇𝜇2−𝜇𝜇3)� , and 
𝑐𝑐8(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 1 −� 𝜇𝜇1+𝜇𝜇 �. 
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Proposition 6 states that non-exclusive licensing—and the resulting Cournot competitionis more 
likely to be used under asymmetric than symmetric information. For an issuing cost at which the 
marginal effect of a second license on the patent holder’s profit is zero under symmetric information, 
that effect is positive for a wide range of the (𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐)-space under asymmetric information. For high 
values of the 𝜇𝜇 and 𝑐𝑐 parameters, the patent holder chooses shut-down contracts for both exclusive 
and non-exclusive licensing. Competition, then, does not reduce the profits of a patent holder 
operating under a shut-down contract because the royalties charged have two benefits: they replicate 
the monopolistic outcome; and they make it more likely that the producer will be efficient (sampling 
effect), which becomes more valuable as uncertainty increases. This sampling effect is high enough to 
compensate for the costs of issuing two licenses, but only for intermediate values of 𝜇𝜇 and 𝑐𝑐. Thus 
non-exclusive licensing through shut-down contracts is of no interest to the patent holder when both 𝜇𝜇 
and 𝑐𝑐 take high values, because in that case the sampling effect tends to be lower and the issuing costs 
higher. For low values of 𝜇𝜇 and 𝑐𝑐, the patent holder prefers separating contracts under exclusive and 
non-exclusive licensing both. In this case, the patent holder is obliged to pay informational rents to the 
efficient user; hence it cannot replicate the monopoly outcome when issuing several licenses. Since, 
moreover, the sampling effect is also low for low values of 𝜇𝜇, it follows that monopoly profits are 
preferred by the patent holder despite the low issuing costs in this case. 
Figure 3 depicts the region in which, under asymmetric information, the patent holder prefers non-
exclusive to exclusive licensing even though, under symmetric information, it would be indifferent 
between them. Observe that this region excludes nearly all of the region where separating contracts 
are used with non-exclusive licensing (i.e., the area under 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)) and a large part of the region where 
a separating contract is used with exclusive licensing (the area under 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)). 
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Figure 3. Region Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3 . In this region, the patent holder 
strictly prefers non-exclusive licensing under asymmetric 
information despite being indifferent (between exclusive vs. non-
exclusive licensing) under symmetric information. 
 
5. Number of licenses and welfare 
In this section we examine the social welfare resulting from patent holder behavior—with regard to 
choosing the number of licenses—under symmetric and also under asymmetric information. Toward 
that end, we define expected aggregate welfare as the sum of expected consumer surplus and 
expected profits achieved by the innovation user(s). 
Thus we examine how the number of licenses granted affects welfare. To do it, we assume that a 
planner always chooses the number of licenses (here, one or two) that increases welfare and allows 
the patent holder (the actual licensor) to set the terms of licensing contracts and the users to decide 
their production strategies as in the equilibrium described above. We therefore suppose that (a) the 
patent holder takes the planner-determined number of licenses as given and then decides (as in the 
equilibria described in previous sections) about forms of contract and (b) either a single user behaves 
as a monopolist or two users behave as Cournot duopolists (also as in the preceding text). By 
comparing the number of licenses in this framework with that in the equilibrium where the patent 
holder determines the number of licenses, we establish that the area of the (𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐)-space where, in 
equilibrium, the patent holder chooses a socially inefficient number of licenses (one license) is much 
smaller under asymmetric information than under symmetric information. The difference depends on 
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three factors: 𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐, and the cost 𝑆𝑆 of issuing a license. As a starting point we consider the issuing cost 
𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) at which, under symmetric information, the patent holder is indifferent between granting one 
or two licenses (cf. Proposition 1). We shall use ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) to denote the per-license issuing cost that 
would yield, again under symmetric information, the same total surplus regardless of whether one or 
two licenses were granted. 
Proposition 7. Let 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) be the per-license issuing cost (as defined in Proposition 1) at which 
patent holder profits are the same under exclusive and non-exclusive licensing when information is 
symmetric. Let ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) = 3
8
𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)(2 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐  be the per-license issuing cost at which, under 
symmetric information, aggregate welfare is the same under exclusive and non-exclusive licensing. 
Then the following statements hold. 
(i) Under symmetric information, if the issuing cost S satisfies 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ≤ 𝑆𝑆 ≤ ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) then non-
exclusive licensing is socially efficient—although exclusive licensing always prevails in 
equilibrium. 
(ii) Under asymmetric information, if the issuing cost S satisfies 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ≤ 𝑆𝑆 ≤ ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) then 
either non-exclusive or exclusive licensing can be socially efficient, depending on the 
parameters 𝜇𝜇 and 𝑐𝑐; moreover, there exist (𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) values for which the number of licenses 
chosen by the patent holder is equal to the socially efficient number. 
Two main conclusions emerge from Proposition 7. Part (i) states that, for the range of issuing costs 
considered, total welfare under symmetric information is always higher under non-exclusive than 
under exclusive licensing; hence, from a social welfare perspective, there is unequivocally insufficient 
diffusion of the innovation. However, the same cannot always be said under asymmetric information. 
In this case, that suboptimal welfare outcome would obtain only for a sufficiently high probability of 
the innovation being transformed by good (rather than bad) users (see Figures A4 and A5 in the 
Appendix). Note that this statement holds even though expected consumer surplus is always greater 
under non-exclusive than exclusive licensing, since in the former case higher quantities are produced 
and selling prices are lower. So when the proportion of efficient users is low enough, the reduction in 
consumer surplus that would follow a move from non-exclusive to exclusive licensing is outweighed 
by the subsequent increase in user profits. In short, the combination of higher prices and lower 
quantities in the market for the final good—as would follow from a reduced number of licenses—does 
not result in an overall loss of welfare. 
The second finding is based on part (ii) of the proposition and follows from comparing the patent 
holder’s optimal number of licenses with the socially optimal number of licenses (again, see Figures 
A4 and A5). When information is asymmetric, it becomes more likely that—in equilibrium—the 
patent holder’s chosen number of licenses is equal to the number that a social planner would choose to 
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maximize aggregate surplus. To emphasize the role of asymmetric information in increasing the 
welfare efficiency of the number of licenses in equilibrium, we prove Proposition 7 for the case of an 
issuing cost per license at which the equilibrium number of licenses under symmetric information is 
inefficient. If 𝑆𝑆 < 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) then we would already have non-exclusive licensing in the symmetric 
information equilibrium. Yet if 𝑆𝑆 > ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), asymmetric information does increase welfare efficiency 
(by increasing the number of licenses granted in equilibrium). This effect is offset as the issuing cost 
increases, however, because the equilibrium number of licenses suffers more from higher issuing 
costs than it benefits from the positive effect stipulated in Proposition 7(ii). 
 
6. Conclusions 
We analyzed an innovation licensing game in which the patent holder must transfer the innovation to 
users capable of turning it into a final good. Each potential user is privately informed about its own 
marginal costs in the event it does use the innovation to produce a final good. We considered the 
patent holder’s problem of simultaneously designing two-part tariff licensing contracts (which are 
fairly common in practice) and deciding how many licenses it should grant. 
The option to choose the number of licenses affects the form of screening contracts to the extent that, 
whereas only the contract intended for an inefficient user includes a royalty (distortion at the bottom) 
under exclusive licensing, if licensing is instead non-exclusive then royalties are included also in 
contracts intended for efficient types (distortion at the top). This first result is partly driven by the 
patent holder’s incentive to replicate the monopoly outcome even when selling two licenses, which 
explains the inclusion of royalties in contracts intended for each type (efficient and inefficient) of 
oligopolistic user. Royalties also serve, just as under exclusive licensing, the patent holder’s purpose 
of making contracts intended for inefficient users less attractive to efficient ones. 
Second, we find that non-exclusive licensing is more likely to be employed under asymmetric 
information. With regard to such adverse selection situation, however, we must distinguish screening 
from the granting of licenses only to efficient users. A patent holder offering contracts that screen the 
users is better-off under exclusive than non-exclusive licensing. Yet if information is symmetric then, 
ceteris paribus, non-exclusive licensing would benefit the patent holder more (than exclusive 
licensing) because the negative effect of competition on the patent holder’s profits can be offset by 
requiring royalty payments. We establish that, when both competition and asymmetric information 
apply, the patent holder must use royalties as a screening device. However, using royalities for 
screening purposes reduces the patent holder’s profits so much that it prefers exclusive licensing to 
the sampling advantages of non-exclusive licensing. 
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Our third main result concerns how welfare is affected by the number of licenses granted—taking as 
given the contracts subsequently offered by the patent holder and also the behavior of potential users 
(producers). If the cost of transferring the innovation to multiple producers is such that aggregate 
welfare under exclusive licensing is greater when information is symmetric than asymmetric, then 
non-exclusive licensing can yield greater welfare under asymmetric information except when the 
patent holder uses a screening contract. With screening, total welfare under exclusive licensing is 
greater even though consumer surplus is higher under non-exclusive licensing. Hence we conclude 
that, under screening, the consumer surplus lost in a move from non-exclusive to exclusive licensing 
is more than offset by the patent holder’s gains. This result emphasizes our second finding by showing 
the extent of screening’s negative effect, when combined with Cournot competition, on patent holder 
profits. 
Summing up, our paper contributes to the licensing literature by adding to the scarce research on 
licensing behavior when the patent holder must determine not only the contract’s optimal form but 
also the optimal number of licenses to grant. We believe that the results reported here can serve as a 
solid benchmark for the more general case of more than one or two competing users. Indeed, a most 
valuable extension of our model would be to consider 𝑛𝑛 potential users (each, as here, capable of 
transforming the innovation into a final product) and then derive the optimal number of licenses 
granted under symmetric and also asymmetric information structures. 
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APPENDIX 
 
To facilitate the exposition, throughout this appendix we use masculine and feminine pronouns when 
referencing (respectively) the patent holder and any users. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) The problem of a patent holder who offers a menu of screening contracts can be written as follows: 
 
max(𝐹𝐹0,𝑟𝑟0,𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)  𝜇𝜇(𝐹𝐹0 + 𝑟𝑟0𝑞𝑞0) + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)
s. t.  
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧
(1−𝑟𝑟0)
4
2
− 𝐹𝐹0 ≥ 0                           (PC0)(1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)
4
2
− 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0                        (PC𝑐𝑐)(1−𝑟𝑟0)
4
2
− 𝐹𝐹0 ≥
(1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)
4
2
− 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐          (IC0)(1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)
4
2
− 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ≥
(1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟0)
4
2
− 𝐹𝐹0  (IC𝑐𝑐) ⎭⎪⎪⎪
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎫
 (A.1) 
Here the subscripts 0 and 𝑐𝑐 denote, respectively, the efficient and inefficient user; 𝑞𝑞0 = 1−𝑟𝑟02  and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 =
1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑐𝑐
2
 are the profit-maximizing quantities for the respective user’s type when acting as a naïve 
monopolist. The two first inequalities in problem (A.1)’s conditions are the participation constraints 
(PC) for the efficient and inefficient user, respectively, and each inequality states that the net profit of 
a user choosing the contract intended for her is no less than zero. The final two inequalities are the 
incentive compatibility (IC) conditions for the efficient and inefficient user, respectively. The first of 
these constraints is that the efficient user’s monopoly profit when agreeing to contract (𝐹𝐹0, 𝑟𝑟0), which 
is aimed at her, is greater than from agreeing to the contract (𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 , 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)—and thus misrepresenting herself 
as an inefficient user. The second IC constraint serves the same purpose but concerns the inefficient 
user. 
We shall first prove that if (PC𝑐𝑐) holds then (PC0) must also hold and so we can ignore it. Note that 
the right-hand side (RHS) of (IC0) is greater than the left-hand side (LHS) of (PC𝑐𝑐) while the LHS of 
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(IC0) is just the LHS of (PC0). Therefore, if (PC𝑐𝑐) holds then (PC0) also holds and hence can be 
ignored.  
Second, we prove that the solution verifies (IC0) with equality and verifies (IC𝑐𝑐) with strict 
inequality, as is typical of such incentive problems. Suppose for the moment that instead we solve the 
problem while ignoring both IC constraints. In that case, it is easy to see that the solution would 
verify both participation constraints with equality. Yet the efficient user would then be better-off 
misrepresenting the innovation as one of low value: if she speaks the truth, her profits will be zero; if 
she lies, her profits will amount to (1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)
4
2
−
(1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑐𝑐)
4
2 > 0. But given that 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = (1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑐𝑐)4 2, those profits 
are equal to the RHS of (IC0) and so the inequality would not hold. In contrast, an inefficient user has 
no incentive to misrepresent the innovation’s perceived value: if she tells the truth then her profits are 
zero, but if she lies then her profits are (1−𝑟𝑟0−𝑐𝑐)
4
2
−
(1−𝑟𝑟0)
4
2 < 0. Therefore, it is safe to ignore (ICc). 
Now we can prove that both (IC0) and (PC𝑐𝑐) will be verified as equalities in the solution. If (IC0) 
were not so verified then the patent holder could always raise 𝐹𝐹0 and thereby increase his profits (note 
that this action would not affect  (PC𝑐𝑐)). In turn,  (PC𝑐𝑐) will also be verified with equality; for if not, 
the patent holder could raise 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐  to increase his profits. Such a raise has the additional effect of 
diminishing the RHS of (IC0), which in turn allows the patent holder to increase 𝐹𝐹0  still further. 
Hence 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = (1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟0)4 2, from which it follows that 
 𝐹𝐹0 = (1−𝑟𝑟0)4 2 − (1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)4 2 + 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = (1−𝑟𝑟0)4 2 − (1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)4 2 + (1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)4 2 (A.2) 
The patent holder’s problem given in (A.1) can be now rewritten as 
 max{𝐹𝐹0,𝑟𝑟0,𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐}  𝜇𝜇 �𝐹𝐹0 + 𝑟𝑟0 1−𝑟𝑟02 � + (1 − 𝜇𝜇) �𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑐𝑐2 � 
  =  1
4
(1 − 𝑐𝑐)2 + 𝑐𝑐
2
𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 −  14 (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐2 − 12 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟02 (A.3) 
the solution of which is 
 𝑟𝑟0 = 0, 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 = 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐1−𝜇𝜇; 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = (1−𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐)24(1−𝜇𝜇)2  , 𝐹𝐹0 = 14 − 𝑐𝑐2 �1 − (1+𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐2(1−𝜇𝜇)� (A.4) 
The user produces 𝑞𝑞0 = 12 if she exploits the innovation efficiently or produces 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 = 1−𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐2(1−𝜇𝜇) if her 
exploitation is inefficient; here 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 > 0 (and 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 > 0) whenever 𝑐𝑐 < 1 − 𝜇𝜇. Finally, expected profits of 
the patent holder (PH) are 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋PH] = 1
4
�1 − 2𝑐𝑐 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐2 + 𝑐𝑐2
1−𝜇𝜇
� (A.5) 
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(ii) If problem (A.1) is solved while ignoring (IC0) and (ICc), then the patent holder cannot screen the 
user’s type and so will offer a single contract (𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟). However, he must still assess the benefits (if any) 
from allowing a bad user to produce the innovation. Suppose that 𝐹𝐹 is such that only the good user 
produces. Then 𝐹𝐹 = (1−𝑟𝑟)2
4
; that is, 𝐹𝐹 is equal to the profits of a monopolist producing 𝑞𝑞0 = 1−𝑟𝑟2  (and 
an inefficient user will market no product based on this innovation). Therefore, the patent holder’s 
optimal per-unit royalty solves 
 max
𝑟𝑟
𝜇𝜇 �
(1−𝑟𝑟)2
4
+ 𝑟𝑟 1−𝑟𝑟
2
� (A.6) 
the solution is 𝑟𝑟 = 0 and so 𝐹𝐹 = 1
4
. The user produces 𝑞𝑞0 = 12 only if she exploits the innovation 
efficiently, in which case the patent holder’s expected profits are 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋G,NSPH ] = 𝜇𝜇4 (A.7) 
here the subscripts G and NS mark the good (zero–marginal cost) user and the “no screening” case. If 
the fixed fee required by the patent holder allows the user to produce according to her type, then the 
participation constraints imply that 𝐹𝐹 = (1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟)2
4
; this is also the profit of a bad (positive–marginal 
cost) user producing 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 = 1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟2 . Yet because an efficient user must pay the same fixed fee, she will 
produce 𝑞𝑞0 = 1−𝑟𝑟2 . In this case, the optimal per-unit royalty is the one that solves 
 max
𝑟𝑟
𝜇𝜇 �
(1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟)2
4
+ 𝑟𝑟 1−𝑟𝑟
2
� + (1 − 𝜇𝜇) �(1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟)2
4
+ 𝑟𝑟 1−𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟
2
� (A.8) 
From (A.8) it follows that 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 and hence that 𝐹𝐹 = (1−(1+𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐)2
4
. Production of the good and bad 
user are then 𝑞𝑞0 = 1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐2  and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 = 1−(1+𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐2 , respectively. We remark that both Assumption 1 and the 
inequalities 0 < 𝜇𝜇 < 1 imply that 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐(1 + 𝜇𝜇) < 1; hence 𝑞𝑞0, 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 , and 𝐹𝐹 are each positive. When 
all these factors are taken into account, the patent holder’s expected profits (under no screening) when 
both user types produce are 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋G+B,NSPH ] = 14 (1 − 2𝑐𝑐 + 𝑐𝑐2 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑐𝑐2) (A.9) 
where the subscript G + B  indicates that both good and bad (efficient and inefficient) users are 
licensed to produce. It is easy to check that 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋G+B,NSPH ] < 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋G,NSPH ] if and only if 
 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) = 11+𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 − 𝜇𝜇2)� ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 11+𝜇𝜇2 �1 + �𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 − 𝜇𝜇2)� (A.10) 
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However, since 𝑐𝑐 < 1
2
 (by Assumption 1) it follows that (A.10)’s upper bound on 𝑐𝑐  is irrelevant 
because 1
1+𝜇𝜇2
�1 + �𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 − 𝜇𝜇2)� > 1
2
 for all 𝜇𝜇 ∈ (0,1). So when the patent holder chooses to offer 
a shut-down contract, the following statements hold. 
(a) If 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) = 11+𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 − 𝜇𝜇2)�, then the contract offered will be (𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) =
�
(1−(1+𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐)2
4
, 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐� and the user will produce irrespective of her type; in this case, the patent 
holder’s expected profits are given by (A.9). 
(b) If 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) = 11+𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 − 𝜇𝜇2)� ≤ 𝑐𝑐 < 12, then the contract offered will be (𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) =
�
1
4
, 0� because the patent holder wants production only by an efficient user; in this case, the 
patent holder’s expected profits are given by (A.7).  
The pink area in Figure A1 corresponds to the region in (𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐)-space where the separating contract 
described in Proposition 2 is well-defined. 
 
Figure A1. Region in (𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) -space where the separating contract 
of Proposition 2 may occur. 
∎ 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
The result follows in a straightforward way from comparing (A.5), (A.7), and (A.9).  
Figure A2 illustrates the results of Proposition 3. There we depict both the region where the user 
produces irrespective of her type (green area) as well as the region where only efficient users employ 
the innovation to produce a marketable good (blank area). 
 
Figure A2. Contracts described by Proposition 3. In the green area, 
the patent holder benefits most from a shut-down contract under 
which either user type can produce. In the blank area, the patent 
holder offers a shut-down contract such that the innovation is 
marketed only by the efficient user. 
∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4 
(i) If the patent holder offers a menu of screening contracts {(𝐹𝐹0, 𝑟𝑟0), (𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 , 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)} to each potential user, 
then he solves the following problem: max{(𝐹𝐹0,𝑟𝑟0),(𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)}{2𝜇𝜇2(𝐹𝐹0 + 𝑟𝑟0𝑞𝑞0) + 2𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝐹𝐹0 + 𝑟𝑟0𝑞𝑞0+𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) + 2(1 − 𝜇𝜇)2(𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐  +  𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)}
s. t.  
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0; 0)] − 𝐹𝐹0 ≥ 0,                                                                                   (PC0)
𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐; 𝑐𝑐)] − 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0,                                                                                    (PC𝑐𝑐)
𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0; 0)] − 𝐹𝐹0 ≥ 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0; 𝑐𝑐)] − 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ,                                                         (IC0)
𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐; 𝑐𝑐)] − 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐; 0)] − 𝐹𝐹0.                                                         (ICc) ⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫
 
(A.12) 
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In the incentive and participation constraints of this problem, 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(?̃?𝑐; ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀) are the expected profits of 
user 𝑖𝑖 under a Cournot equilibrium, where ?̃?𝑐 = {0, 𝑐𝑐} is 𝑖𝑖’s true type and   ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀 = {0, 𝑐𝑐} is user 𝑖𝑖’s self-
reported type—assuming that user 𝑗𝑗 tells the truth about her type. If ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀 = ?̃?𝑐, then 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(?̃?𝑐; ?̃?𝑐)] are 𝑖𝑖’s 
expected profits when all users tell the truth about their type; if ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀 ≠ ?̃?𝑐, then 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(?̃?𝑐; ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀)] denotes 𝑖𝑖’s 
expected profits when user 𝑖𝑖 lies about her type but user 𝑗𝑗 does not. Those profits are computed as 
follows.  
First suppose that ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀 = ?̃?𝑐. Then, for ?̃?𝑐 ∈ {0, 𝑐𝑐} and each user 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, we compute 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(?̃?𝑐; ?̃?𝑐)] by 
solving the  problem 
 max
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐�
𝑖𝑖
�1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐̃ − ?̃?𝑐 − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐̃𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞0𝑗𝑗 − (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗� 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐̃𝑖𝑖  , 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖 (A.13) 
where the first-order condition is 
 1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐̃ − ?̃?𝑐 − 2𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐̃𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞0𝑗𝑗 − (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 = 0 (A.14) 
For 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, solving the four equations defined by (A.14) yields 
 𝑞𝑞0𝑖𝑖 = 16 (2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) − (3 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0) (A.15) 
 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 16 (2 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) + 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟0) (A.16) 
the resulting users’ expected profits are then 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0; 0)] = 1
36
(2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟B) + (𝜇𝜇 − 3)𝑟𝑟G)2 (A.17) 
  𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐; 𝑐𝑐)] = 1
36
(2(1 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑟𝑟B) + 𝜇𝜇(𝑟𝑟G − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑟𝑟B))2 (A.18) 
(recall from (A.9) that the subscripts G and B denote, respectively, good and bad users). Now suppose 
that ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀 ≠ ?̃?𝑐. To compute 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(?̃?𝑐; ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀)] for each user 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2} and for 𝑐𝑐,� ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀 ∈ {0, 𝑐𝑐} when ?̃?𝑐𝑀𝑀 ≠ ?̃?𝑐, we 
solve the problem 
 max
𝑞𝑞
𝑐𝑐� ,𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 �1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐̃𝑀𝑀 − ?̃?𝑐 − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐̃,𝑐𝑐̃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞0𝑗𝑗 − (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗� 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐̃,𝑐𝑐̃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖  (A.19) 
here 𝑞𝑞0
𝑗𝑗 and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐
𝑗𝑗 (𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖) are given by (A.15) and (A.16), respectively. The solutions to these 
two problems are 
  𝑞𝑞0,𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 16 (2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟0), (A.20) 
 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐,0𝑖𝑖 = 16 (2 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 − (3 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0) (A.21) 
from which follow 
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 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0; 𝑐𝑐)] = 1
36
(2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟0 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)2, (A.22) 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐; 0)] = 1
36
(2 + (𝜇𝜇 − 3)𝑟𝑟0 − (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐)2 (A.23) 
for each user 𝑖𝑖. Now substituting expressions (A.15)–(A.18) as well as (A.22) and (A.23) into (A.12), 
we can write the patent holder’s problem as 
max{(𝐹𝐹0,𝑟𝑟0),(𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)} �2𝜇𝜇2 �𝐹𝐹0 + 𝑟𝑟0 16 (2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) − (3 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0)�                             + 2𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇) �𝐹𝐹0 + 𝑟𝑟0 16 (2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) − (3 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0)+𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐                                                         + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 16 (2 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) + 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟0)�                              + 2(1 − 𝜇𝜇)2 �𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 16 (2 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) + 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟0)��
              (A.24) 
subject to 136 (2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) − (3 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0)2 − 𝐹𝐹0 ≥ 0,                                                                       (PC0)136 (2(1 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) + 𝜇𝜇(𝑟𝑟0 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐))2 − 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0,                                                                            (PC𝑐𝑐)136 (2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) − (3 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0)2 − 𝐹𝐹0                                                            ≥ 136 (2 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟0 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐)2 − 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ,                    (IC0)136 (2(1 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐) + 𝜇𝜇(𝑟𝑟0 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐))2 − 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐                                                           ≥ 136 (2 − (3 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0 − (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 − (2 + 𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐)2 − 𝐹𝐹0        (IC𝑐𝑐)
 
We can use the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2 to show that, in the solution to 
problem (A.24), (PC0) and (IC𝑐𝑐) are verified with strict inequality (and so can be ignored) whereas (PC𝑐𝑐) and (IC0) are verified with equality. So if we now substitute (PC𝑐𝑐) and(IC0) into (A.24) as 
equalities, then the problem can be written as 
max{𝑟𝑟0,𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐} � 118𝜇𝜇(𝜇𝜇 − 9)𝑟𝑟02 + 118 (7𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇𝜇2 − 8)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐2             + 19 𝜇𝜇�2 − 𝑐𝑐(2 + 𝜇𝜇)�𝑟𝑟0 + 19 (2 − 2𝑐𝑐 − 2𝜇𝜇 + 10𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇 + 𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇2)𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐             + 19 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑟𝑟0𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + 118 (4 − 8𝑐𝑐 + 4𝑐𝑐2 − 4𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇 + 4𝑐𝑐2𝜇𝜇 + 𝑐𝑐2𝜇𝜇2)�
 
Provided that 0 < 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐3(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 1−𝜇𝜇1+𝜇𝜇�, the solutions are 𝑟𝑟0 = 1−𝑐𝑐4  and 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 = 1−𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐+5𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐4(1−𝜇𝜇) . But if 
𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑐𝑐3(𝜇𝜇) then, under the computed fees for 𝑟𝑟0 and 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐, the production 𝑞𝑞0 and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 as given by (A.15) 
and (A.16) would be zero. Figure A3 illustrates the region wherein a separating contract is profitable 
for the patent holder. 
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Figure A3. The region (outlined in pink) in which the patent holder 
profits from a separating contract. 
 
If 0 < 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐3(𝜇𝜇), then substituting the values obtained for 𝑟𝑟0 and 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐  into the constraints (PC0) and (IC𝑐𝑐) of problem (A.24)—when written as equalities—yields 
 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 = (1−𝜇𝜇−𝑐𝑐−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐)216(1−𝜇𝜇)2  (A.27) 
 𝐹𝐹0 = 1−𝜇𝜇−(2−𝑐𝑐−2𝜇𝜇−7𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐16(1−𝜇𝜇)  (A.28) 
If we now substitute the solution into the objective function of (A.24), then the patent holder’s 
expected profits when 0 < 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐3(𝜇𝜇) are 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋PH] = 1−𝜇𝜇−2(1−𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐+(1−𝜇𝜇+2𝜇𝜇2)𝑐𝑐2
4(1−𝜇𝜇)  (A.29) 
(ii) If the patent holder does not screen potential users, then he can offer the same contract (𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) to 
both user types by ignoring the IC constraints. That being said, the patent holder has two options: 
offer contracts under which only efficient users are encouraged to produce; or offer contracts under 
which both good and bad users find it attractive to produce. In the former case, the patent holder 
solves the problem 
 max𝐹𝐹0,𝑟𝑟0 2(𝜇𝜇2 + 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇))(𝐹𝐹 + 𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞) s.t. 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0)] ≥ 𝐹𝐹 (A.30) 
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here 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0)] are the expected profits for user 𝑖𝑖 in a Cournot equilibrium where only efficient users 
produce. To compute 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0)], each user takes the rival’s production as given and solves the problem 
 max𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖 (A.31) 
The Cournot solution for this problem is 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 1−𝑟𝑟
2+𝜇𝜇
 , and users’ expected profits are 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0)] = �1−𝑟𝑟
2+𝜇𝜇
�
2
 (A. 32) 
It follows that, in the solution to the patent holder’s problem (A.30), the fixed fee is given by 
 𝐹𝐹 = �1−𝑟𝑟
2+𝜇𝜇
�
2
 (A.33) 
hence the problem can be rewritten as 
 max
𝑟𝑟
2𝜇𝜇 ��1−𝑟𝑟
2+𝜇𝜇
�
2 + 𝑟𝑟 1−𝑟𝑟
2+𝜇𝜇
� (A.34) 
The solution to (A.34) is 
 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜇𝜇
2+2𝜇𝜇
  (A.35) 
and the patent holder’s expected profits are 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋PH] = 𝜇𝜇
2+2𝜇𝜇
  (A.36) 
In the alternative scenario under which the patent holder allows both user types to produce, his 
problem becomes 
 max(𝐹𝐹,𝑟𝑟) 2𝜇𝜇2(𝐹𝐹 + 𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞0) + 2𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)�2𝐹𝐹 + 𝑟𝑟(𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)� + 2(1 − 𝜇𝜇)2(𝐹𝐹 + 𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)      (A.37) 
   s.t. 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0)] ≥ 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐)] ≥ 𝐹𝐹  
In the restrictions to this problem, 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(?̃?𝑐)] (𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, ?̃?𝑐 ∈ {0, 𝑐𝑐}) is derived by solving the problem 
 max𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐�𝑖𝑖 (1 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐̃𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞0𝑗𝑗 − (1 − 𝜇𝜇)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐̃𝑖𝑖   (A.38) 
whose solution in a Cournot equilibrium is the same as the solution to problem (A.13) when 𝑟𝑟0 = 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 =
𝑟𝑟—namely, 
 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 = 16 (2 − 2𝑐𝑐 − 2𝑟𝑟 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐) (A.39) 
Using these quantities to compute 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(?̃?𝑐)] in problem (A.38) now gives 
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 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(0)] = 1
36
(2 + 𝑐𝑐 − 2𝑟𝑟 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐)2 > 1
36
(2 − 2𝑐𝑐 − 2𝑟𝑟 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐)2 = 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐)] (A.40) 
Therefore, the solution to problem (A.37) must verify 
 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐)] = 1
36
(2 − 2𝑐𝑐 − 2𝑟𝑟 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐)2 (A.41) 
a problem that can be recast as 
 max𝑟𝑟  118 (4(𝑐𝑐 − 2𝑟𝑟 − 1)(𝑐𝑐 + 𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 4𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐 + 4𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 𝜇𝜇2𝑐𝑐2) (A.42) 
The solution to (A.42) is 
 𝑟𝑟 = 1
4
+ �𝜇𝜇 − 1
4
� 𝑐𝑐 (A.43) 
which applies as long as 𝑐𝑐 ≤ min �1
2
, 1
1+2𝜇𝜇
�; otherwise, production would not be positive. 
Taking the solution to the objective function in (A.37), we obtain 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋PH] = 1
4
(1 + (𝑐𝑐 + 2𝜇𝜇2𝑐𝑐 − 2)𝑐𝑐) (A.44) 
When 𝑐𝑐 ≥ min �1
2
, 1
1+2𝜇𝜇
�, the patent holder will choose the contract—given by (A.32) and (A.35)—
that allows only efficient users to produce; this strategy yields him the profits given in (A.36). To see 
which option is better for the patent holder when 𝑐𝑐 ≤ min �1
2
, 1
1+2𝜇𝜇
�, we must compare his profits as 
given by (A.36) and as given by (A.44). Thus we find that both user types should be allowed to 
produce if and only if 
 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇) = min�12 , 11+2𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�2𝜇𝜇(1−𝜇𝜇+𝜇𝜇2)1+𝜇𝜇 �� (A.45) 
in which case the patent holder offers the contract given by (A.41) and (A.43). Otherwise, if 𝑐𝑐 ≥
𝑐𝑐4(𝜇𝜇), he is better-off allowing only efficient users to produce—in which case he offers the contract 
given by (A.33) and (A.35). Figure A4 shows the regions in which the patent holder benefits from 
offering two different contracts.  
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Figure A4. The entire region beneath the blue locus is where the patent holder 
prefers a single contract under which both user types produce. In the pink area, the 
patent holder is better-off with a single contract under which only efficient users 
produce. (No such comparisons are relevant above the green locus because a contract 
under which all user types produce is not profitable in that region.) 
∎ 
Proof of Proposition 5 
To identify the patent holder’s preferred contract, we need to compare his profits under the contracts 
established via parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4. When inequality (A.45) is satisfied, it is easy to see 
that the patent holder’s profits under the single contract given by (A.44) are less than his profits under 
a separating contract as given by (A.29). However, when 𝑐𝑐 is not less than the RHS of (A.45), a 
separating contract is better than a single contract intended for efficient users—in other words, the 
profits given by (A.29) are greater than those given by (A.36)—if and only if 
 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) = min�12 , 1−𝜇𝜇1−𝜇𝜇+2𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�2𝜇𝜇(1−𝜇𝜇)1+𝜇𝜇 �� (A.46) 
Finally, the patent holder’s profits are given by (A.29) when 0 < 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 5(𝜇𝜇) and by (A.36) when 
𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) ≤ 𝑐𝑐 < 0.5.                                                                                                                                 ∎ 
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Proof of Proposition 6 
If licensing is exclusive then we know from Proposition 2 that, above the locus 𝜇𝜇 + 𝑐𝑐 = 1, the patent 
holder will offer a shut-down contract whereby only the efficient user produces. In the region where a 
separating contract is profitable (green area in Figure 1; this region includes the area under the blue 
locus in Figure 2), we must determine which is better for the patent holder: the separating contract or 
the corresponding shut-down contract as follows: 
1. If 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 11+𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇𝜇2)��, then the patent holder’s profits 
under a shut-down contract are given by (A.9). It is easy to check that (A.5) is always greater 
than (A.9), so the patent holder will choose the separating contract given in Proposition 2(i). 
2. If 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 11+𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇𝜇2)�� ≤ 𝑐𝑐 < min �12 , 1 − 𝜇𝜇�, then the patent 
holder’s profits under a shut-down contract are given by (A.7). A comparison of (A.5) and 
(A.7) reveals that the separating contract is better for the patent holder if and only if 
𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇) = min �12 , 11 + 𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇𝜇2)�� ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)            = min �12 , 1 − 𝜇𝜇1 − 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇𝜇2 �1 −�𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)�� 
Otherwise, the patent holder will choose the shut-down contract and receive the profits given 
by (A.7). 
We can use the previous reasoning to conclude that, under exclusive licensing, patent holder profits 
are given by (A.5) as long as 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) and otherwise are given by (A.7): 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋1PH] = �14 �1 − 2𝑐𝑐 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐2 + 𝑐𝑐21−𝜇𝜇� if 0 < 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)𝜇𝜇
4
                                         if 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) ≤ 𝑐𝑐 < 12  (A.47) 
With non-exclusive licensing, the proof of Proposition 5 implies that 
 𝐸𝐸[𝜋𝜋2PH] = �1−𝜇𝜇−2(1−𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐+(1−𝜇𝜇+2𝜇𝜇2)𝑐𝑐24(1−𝜇𝜇) if 0 < 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)𝜇𝜇
2+2𝜇𝜇
                                     if 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) ≤ 𝑐𝑐 < 12  (A.48) 
Subscripts “1” and “2” mean “one license” and “two licenses”, respectively. Comparing (A.47) and 
(A.48) now yields the stated result.                                                                                                     ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 7 
With exclusive licensing, expected consumer net surplus is given by 
 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆1] = 12 (𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝑝𝑝0)𝑞𝑞0 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) (A.49) 
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for 𝑝𝑝0 = 1 − 𝑞𝑞0 and 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = 1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐. Similarly, expected poducer net surplus (before issuing costs) are 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1] = 𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝑞𝑞0)𝑞𝑞0 + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)(1 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 (A.50) 
With non-exclusive licensing, the expected consumer surplus is given by 
 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆2] = 12 (𝜇𝜇2(1 − 𝑝𝑝0)2𝑞𝑞0 + 2𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)(1 − 𝑝𝑝0𝑐𝑐)(𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) + (1 − 𝜇𝜇)2(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐)2𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) (A.51) 
(here 𝑝𝑝0 = 1 − 2𝑞𝑞0, 𝑝𝑝0𝑐𝑐 = 1 − (𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐), and 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = 1 − 2𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) and the expected producer net 
surplus is 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆2] = 𝜇𝜇2(1 − 2𝑞𝑞0)2𝑞𝑞0 + 2𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)�1 − (𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)�(𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) +  (1 − 𝜇𝜇)2(1 − 2𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)2𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 (A.52) 
(i) Under symmetric information, the monopoly quantities produced by a single user are 𝑞𝑞0 = 12 and 
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 = 1−𝑐𝑐2 . Hence the expected consumer surplus is 
 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆] = 𝜇𝜇+(1−𝜇𝜇)(1−𝑐𝑐)28  (A.53) 
Here the superscript “SI” stands for “symmetric information”. The user’s profits are equal to 1
4
 or to (1−𝑐𝑐)2
4
 according as whether she is a good or bad producer. Therefore, from (A.50) it follows that the 
user’s gross expected surplus (before issuing costs) are equal to 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1SI] = 𝜇𝜇+(1−𝜇𝜇)(1−𝑐𝑐)24  (A.54) 
Under non-exclusive licensing, the Cournot quantities produced by users are 𝑞𝑞0𝑖𝑖 = 14 and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 1−𝑐𝑐2  for 
(respectively) good and bad users of the patented innovation. Hence it follows from (A.49) that the 
expected consumer surplus is 
 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆2SI] = 1−(1−𝜇𝜇)2(2−𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐 8  (A.55) 
and from (A.50) that the expected porducers net surplus is 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆2SI] = 1− (1−𝜇𝜇)2(2−𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐 4  (A.56) 
Equations (A.53)–(A.56) establish that the total surplus from non-exclusive licensing is greater than 
that from exclusive licensing if and only if 𝑆𝑆 ≤ ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), where ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) solves 
 𝜇𝜇+(1−𝜇𝜇)(1−𝑐𝑐)2
8
+ 𝜇𝜇+(1−𝜇𝜇)(1−𝑐𝑐)2
4
− ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) = 1−  (1−𝜇𝜇)2(2−𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐
8
+ 1− (1−𝜇𝜇)2(2−𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐
4
− 2?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) (A.57) 
therefore, 
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 ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) = 3
8
𝜇𝜇(1 − 𝜇𝜇)(2 − 𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐 (A.58) 
It is easy to show that ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) > 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) for all (𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ∈ (0,1) × �0, 1
2
�. Moreover, if 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) ≤ 𝑆𝑆 ≤
?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) then the patent holder will choose exclusive licensing—although aggregate expected welfare 
would be greater under non-exclusive licensing. 
(ii) Under asymmetric information, the expected consumer net surplus from exclusive licensing is 
given by 
 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆1AI] = �(1−𝑐𝑐)2−𝜇𝜇(1−2𝑐𝑐)8(1−𝜇𝜇) if 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)𝜇𝜇
8
if 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) (A.59) 
where “AI” stands for “asymmetric information”. (There is no surplus defined when 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) 
because in that case production is not continuous.) Equation (A.59) is obtained from (A.49) as 
follows. Quantities 𝑞𝑞0 and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 are the monopoly quantities produced by (respectively) the good and 
bad user. According to Proposition 2, a self-selection (screening) contract results in 𝑞𝑞0 = 12 and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 =
1−𝑐𝑐−𝜇𝜇
2(1−𝜇𝜇) whereas a shut-down contract—under which only the efficient user produces—results in 𝑞𝑞0 =
1
2
 and 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 = 0. Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows that the patent holder will choose the former contract 
if 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) and will otherwise choose the latter. Substituting these values into (A.49), our expression 
for the consumer surplus when the profit-maximizing patent holder chooses exclusive licensing, now 
yields (A.59). 
Under exclusive licensing, we obtain expected producer surplus (before issuing costs) is by 
substituting the quantities from Propositions 2 and 3 into (A.50). The result is 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1AI] = �1−𝜇𝜇−2(1−𝜇𝜇)2𝑐𝑐+(1−2𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐24(1−𝜇𝜇) if 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)𝜇𝜇
4
if 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) (A.60) 
Total expected welfare 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊1AI] under exclusive licensing and asymmetric information is therefore 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊1AI] = 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆1AI] + 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1AI] = �3(1−𝜇𝜇)−�6−10𝜇𝜇+4𝜇𝜇2�𝑐𝑐+(3−4𝜇𝜇)𝑐𝑐28(1−𝜇𝜇) if 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)3𝜇𝜇
8
if 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇) (A.61) 
When licensing is non-exclusive, we can use (A.51) and the results of Propositions 4 and 5 to derive 
the expected consumer net surplus as 
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 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆2AI] = �1−𝜇𝜇+(𝑐𝑐+𝜇𝜇(2+𝑐𝑐)−2)𝑐𝑐8(1−𝜇𝜇) if 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)1
4(1+𝜇𝜇) if 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)  (A.62) 
and the expected porducers net surplus as 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆2AI] = �1−𝜇𝜇−�3+2𝜇𝜇(𝜇𝜇−3)�𝑐𝑐+�2−𝜇𝜇−2𝜇𝜇2�𝑐𝑐28(1−𝜇𝜇) if 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)𝜇𝜇(1+2𝜇𝜇)
2(1+𝜇𝜇)2 if 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) (A.63) 
Then total expecte surplus amounts to 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊2AI] = 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆2AI] + 𝐸𝐸[𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆2AI] =
⎩
⎨
⎧3+�5(𝑐𝑐−2)+ 21−𝜇𝜇+4𝜇𝜇(1+𝑐𝑐)�𝑐𝑐
8
if 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇)
𝜇𝜇(3+5𝜇𝜇)
4(1+𝜇𝜇)2 if 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) (A.64) 
Now suppose that the issuing costs 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) are such that the patent holder is indifferent between 
exclusive and non-exclusive licensing. In this case, non-exclusive licensing yields higher total 
expected welfare (than does exclusive licensing) if and only if 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊2AI] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊1AI] ≥ 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) (A.65) 
After substituting the expressions for 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊1AI], 𝐸𝐸[𝑊𝑊2AI], and 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), we see that this inequality holds 
as long as 
 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧min �12 , 𝑐𝑐2(𝜇𝜇)� ≤ 𝑐𝑐 if 0 < 𝜇𝜇 ≤ 0.29
−3+7𝜇𝜇−6𝜇𝜇2+2𝜇𝜇3
−3+6𝜇𝜇−4𝜇𝜇2+2𝜇𝜇3
− �
3𝜇𝜇+𝜇𝜇2−13𝜇𝜇3+21𝜇𝜇4−34𝜇𝜇5+34𝜇𝜇6−16𝜇𝜇7+4𝜇𝜇8(1+𝜇𝜇)2(−3+6𝜇𝜇−4𝜇𝜇2+2𝜇𝜇3)2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 if 0.29 ≤ 𝜇𝜇 ≤ 0.49
2−8𝜇𝜇2+4𝜇𝜇3
2+5𝜇𝜇−8𝜇𝜇2+2𝜇𝜇3
≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐5(𝜇𝜇) if 0.47 ≤ 𝜇𝜇 ≤ 0.49max � 2−8𝜇𝜇2+4𝜇𝜇3
2+5𝜇𝜇−8𝜇𝜇2+2𝜇𝜇3
, 0� ≤ 𝑐𝑐 if 0.49 ≤ 𝜇𝜇 < 1
 (A.66) 
Comparing this region with the region (defined in Proposition 6 and shown in Figure 3) in which the 
patent holder grants two licenses, we see that the latter is nearly—but not completely—subsumed by 
the former; see Figure A5. The implication is that, under asymmetric information, if issuing costs are 
given by 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) then the number of licenses (either one or two) granted by the patent holder is 
socially efficient for a wide range of parameters. There is also a tiny region (the blank area above the 
locus 𝑐𝑐7(𝜇𝜇)) in which the patent holder chooses non-exclusive licensing even though aggregate 
welfare is higher under exclusive licensing. 
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Figure A5. When the issuing cost is given by 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), non-exclusive 
licensing yields a greater surplus in the red area; in the blank area, a 
greater surplus results from exclusive licensing. The patent holder 
chooses non-exclusive licensing in the area delimited by 𝑐𝑐6(𝜇𝜇), 𝑐𝑐7(𝜇𝜇), 
and 𝑐𝑐8(𝜇𝜇). 
 
Next we assume that the issuing cost is given instead by ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐). In this case, the region in which the 
patent holder chooses non-exclusive licensing is defined as in Proposition 6 but while using ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) 
(rather than 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐)) and with 𝑐𝑐6(𝜇𝜇), 𝑐𝑐7(𝜇𝜇), and 𝑐𝑐8(𝜇𝜇) replaced by 
 𝑐𝑐6′ (𝜇𝜇) = 2(3−6𝜇𝜇+3𝜇𝜇2)3−4𝜇𝜇+3𝜇𝜇2  (A.67) 
 𝑐𝑐7′ (𝜇𝜇) = 5𝜇𝜇−6𝜇𝜇2+3𝜇𝜇3−2+5𝜇𝜇−8𝜇𝜇2+3𝜇𝜇3 − �2𝜇𝜇−11𝜇𝜇2+25𝜇𝜇3−34𝜇𝜇4+36𝜇𝜇5−27𝜇𝜇6+9𝜇𝜇7(1+𝜇𝜇)(5𝜇𝜇−8𝜇𝜇2+3𝜇𝜇3−2)2  (A.68) 
 𝑐𝑐8′ (𝜇𝜇) = 1 −� 1+3𝜇𝜇3(1+𝜇𝜇) (A.69) 
respectively. Now repeating the computations for total surplus but with ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐) instead of 𝑆𝑆∗(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), we 
find that non-exclusive licensing leads to a higher aggregate surplus if and only if 
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 𝑐𝑐 ≥
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧min �12 , 𝑐𝑐1(𝜇𝜇)� if 0 < 𝜇𝜇 ≤ 0.42
−3+8𝜇𝜇−8𝜇𝜇2+3𝜇𝜇3
−3+7𝜇𝜇−6𝜇𝜇2+3𝜇𝜇3
− �
7𝜇𝜇2−13𝜇𝜇3+14𝜇𝜇4−33𝜇𝜇5+46𝜇𝜇6−30𝜇𝜇7+9𝜇𝜇8(1+𝜇𝜇)2(7𝜇𝜇−6𝜇𝜇2+3𝜇𝜇3−3)2 if 0.42 ≤ 𝜇𝜇 ≤ 0.54max �2+2𝜇𝜇−12𝜇𝜇2+6𝜇𝜇3
2+6𝜇𝜇−10𝜇𝜇2+3𝜇𝜇3
, 0� if 0.54 ≤ 𝜇𝜇 < 1  (A.70) 
The patent holder chooses non-exclusive licensing in the region defined by 
(A.67)–(A.69). Yet that area is contained within the region, defined by 
(A.70), where aggregate surplus (under non-exclusive licensing) is higher; 
see Figure A6.  
 
Figure A6. When the issuing cost is ?̃?𝑆(𝜇𝜇, 𝑐𝑐), non-exclusive licensing yields a greater 
surplus in the red area; in the blank area, a surplus results from exclusive licensing. 
The patent holder chooses non-exclusive licensing in the area delimited by 𝑐𝑐6′ (𝜇𝜇), 
𝑐𝑐7
′ (𝜇𝜇), and 𝑐𝑐8′ (𝜇𝜇). 
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